BANGKOK -- As tensions between the U.S. and China rise, the two superpowers are ramping up their involvement in the Mekong region, consisting of Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar.

Suriyan Vitchtlekarn, executive director of the Mekong Institute, an intergovernmental think-tank based in Thailand, said in a recent interview with Nikkei Asia, "the U.S. government needs to be very careful not to misplace its strategy in the region."

Edited excerpts from the interview follow.

Q: What impact do you see from the launch of the China-Laos high-speed railway?

A: Cross-border trade and connectivity among southern China and Mekong countries has evolved a lot over the last 20 years. It started with sea routes and then gradually built into river systems and now to road connectivity. One thing we see [as] a great trend is that logistics and connectivity will become diversified.

The China-Laos railway project is seen as symbolic. It brings [us] one step closer [to] the North-South economic corridor. It's not complete yet, but if the North-South economic corridor through this railway system is completed, it will boost transportation diversity and connectivity.

Q: How will the China-Laos railway change logistics in the region?

A: High-value goods will likely use this railway. [For example], it could be some sort of fresh fruit with high value, the railway could be [used for the] logistics of high-value products for faster delivery.

It could also potentially bring multimodal transportation, instead of using point-to-point by road, they will start to relay more by railway. And this railway project will be a main backbone line that spreads further into the logistics [systems] of neighboring areas.

Q: How does China benefit from this railway project?

A: I think it has benefits for China and is in the interest of China ... because the gateways from China to Mekong countries have been from two Southern provinces. One is from Nanjing, via Guangxi to Vietnam. The other one is from Kunming by road. Because of mountainous areas, that takes two days. So, the train can make a difference.

Q: Some people are concerned about the so-called debt trap for Laos, like the high amount of debt in Sri Lanka. How do you view such opinions?

A: I do not quite agree for a few reasons. One is that Laos has quite a strong policy of changing its limitations as a landlocked country to being 'land-linked.' That policy needs to be translated concretely in some form of connectivity project.

Secondly, Laos will see the possibility of adding value to its economy. Unlike in Sri Lanka, Laos can build up a value added economy [by connecting to neighboring nations].

Last but not least, I think there is also interest, not only from China, but Vietnam and other external partners to look into using Laos as an 'inter-linkage' hub. The idea is trying to leverage the [country's] potential and create a more diversified multimodal transportation system.

Q: The China-Laos railway has to extend into Thailand to maximize its economic efficiency. But the Thai government seems to be reluctant to speed up the project. How do you see the current situation in Thailand?

A: I can only speculate, but I have two theories. One is the deal on co-investing in the rail project with China. This theory is that the deal may not be particularly appealing to Thailand, or Thailand feels concerned about the conditions of the deal. The other theory was that they are concerned whether with Thailand and certain countries that are not ready to capitalize on the opportunity, if the project was completed ... soon, it may not be beneficial or it will not have an equal benefit to the country.

Q: Why is the Mekong region important for external partners like Japan, China or Australia?

A: There are a number of reasons. The Mekong region is one of the major [sources of] natural resources. It could be one of the emerging economic hubs of Asia. Many external partners find that they cannot trade directly with Asia without having a presence in the region.

If you look into the countries that we just named, some of them put in place the 'Indo-Pacific Strategy.' The Indo-Pacific Strategy recognizes the geopolitical importance of the Mekong region; not only in terms of economics, but [also] geopolitically.

Q: How do tensions between the U.S. and China affect the Mekong region?

A: I see that the U.S. has no direct benefit from the region and therefore, we all see the U.S. [only] offering to help a country that might [provide an] advantage from the U.S. point of view.

Q: Why is the U.S. focusing on the region, then?

A: First, I think China domination in the Mekong sub-region has been a great concern [for the U.S.], because this is not about geopolitics alone, but ... [also] trade.

If I can create two scenarios, one scenario is everything is Chinese-centric development. So this will even worsen the current balance of the global trading system. At the other end, if there is some counterbalance ... then at least the problem ... will not be so severe.

I think basically, if you look into U.S. government policy like the Mekong-U.S. partnership strategy and things like that, you see that they address it from a few entry points. One is about water resource management. Because without effective water resource management, this could worsen the economy of the Mekong countries.

The other entry point is nontraditional security issues. Cyberattacks, health issues, human rights issues. All of these point to the fact that quick economic development that does not show social environmental responsibility, perhaps should not be welcomed. That's in the forefront. But at the back of the stage, this could be counterproductive against a number of plans.

Q: How is the U.S. trying to be involved in the Mekong region?

A: I think the U.S. helps the Mekong to counteract external force, not to incline to a certain direction. I think that is the main [reason]. At the same time, the U.S. government also finds it difficult for a few Mekong countries to accept the U.S.'s role. Otherwise, if the U.S. government has a very strong position of interfering, then they will not be welcomed. The U.S. government needs to be very careful as well, and not to misplace strategy that could be used ... to push the U.S. out.

Q: How does China approach the region?

A: To answer this, we need to understand China's interest in Asia and the Mekong region first. If you look at the grand plan of China ... [that] is driven by two major initiatives. One is the Belt and Road Initiative. That is basically [about] Asia and Europe interconnectivity. The other one is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is an Asian-wide FTA.

The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation is an important connecting piece between China and Southeast Asia, because China cannot connect to the rest of Southeast Asia, then connect to Southeast Asia through the Mekong. So for that reason, this becomes an important connecting piece. Without connecting pieces, the big grand plan will not be complete.

Q: Do you mean that the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation allows China to zoom in on what needs to be done?

A: At least LMC is driven by China. Of course, all the other countries are party to this cooperation. But if you see resources and how the Chinese government pours in resources to drive the action plan, for example, through the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Special Fund, that also shows how enthusiastic the Chinese government is.

It may not be bad if it is done for mutual interest and benefit. Because doing that, it also serves the purpose of mutual interest, and at the same time the Chinese government. There is another layer of benefit, which is linking to their grand plan. But often times, because of the capacity of other Mekong countries, mutual benefit might be questioned or the rate of getting benefit may be questionable. I don't think the Chinese government has bad intentions. But because of their capacity, it appears that they're stronger and they get more, I think.

By asia.nikkei.com